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Abstract:&OLPDWHFKDQJHDQGLWVFRQVHTXHQFHVKDYHEHFRPHDPDMRUSXEOLFFRQFHUQ
DQGSROLF\LVVXHLQPDQ\FRXQWULHV,QVRPHFRXQWULHVWKLVDOVRLQFOXGHVQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\
DFWRUVSDUWLFXODUO\WKHDUPHGIRUFHVLQWKHELJFRXQWULHVVXFKDV86$8.&KLQDDQG
5XVVLD
$FKDQJLQJFOLPDWHZLOOKDYHUHDOLPSDFWVRQRXUPLOLWDU\DQGWKHZD\LWH[HFXWHVLWVPLV
VLRQ7KHPLOLWDU\FRXOGEHFDOOHGXSRQPRUHRIWHQWRVXSSRUWFLYLODXWKRULWLHVDQGSURYLGH
KXPDQLWDULDQDVVLVWDQFHDQGGLVDVWHUUHOLHILQWKHIDFHRIPRUHIUHTXHQWDQGPRUHLQWHQVH
QDWXUDOGLVDVWHUV2XUFRDVWDOLQVWDOODWLRQVDUHYXOQHUDEOHWRULVLQJVHDOHYHOVDQGLQFUHDVHG
ÀRRGLQJZKLOHGURXJKWVZLOG¿UHVDQGPRUHH[WUHPHWHPSHUDWXUHVFRXOGWKUHDWHQPDQ\RI
RXUWUDLQLQJDFWLYLWLHV2XUVXSSO\FKDLQVFRXOGEHLPSDFWHGDQGZHZLOOQHHGWRHQVXUH
RXUFULWLFDOHTXLSPHQWZRUNVXQGHUPRUHH[WUHPHZHDWKHUFRQGLWLRQV
7KHVHLPSDFWVLQFUHDVHWKHIUHTXHQF\VFDOHDQGFRPSOH[LW\RIIXWXUHGHIHQFHPLVVLRQVUH
TXLULQJKLJKHUFRVWVRIPLOLWDU\EDVHPDLQWHQDQFHDQGLPSDFWLQJWKHHৼHFWLYHQHVVRIWURRSV
DQGHTXLSPHQWLQFRQÀLFW
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1. Why do Militaries Care about Climate Change?
&OLPDWHFKDQJHSUHVHQWVULVNVWRWKUHHHOHPHQWVRIPLOLWDU\H൵HFWLYHQHVVUHDGL-
ness, operations and strategy.
Readiness: Readiness refers to the ability of a military to carry out operations 
in a timely manner. Climate change will directly impact military readiness, impact-
ing installations and operations in a number of ways that include the availability of 
TXDOLW\ODQGDQGUDQJHVUHGXFWLRQVLQZDWHUVXSSO\JUHDWHUÀRRGDQG¿UHKD]DUGVDQG
weather risks to the electricity supply. Installations near the coastlines are threatened 
by coastal erosion and sea level rise, damaging infrastructure and reducing the land 
DYDLODEOH IRU RSHUDWLRQV ,QWHQVL¿HG KHDWZDYHVZLOO SUHVHQW FKDOOHQJHV WR RXWGRRU
WUDLQLQJDQGSHUVRQQHOH൶FLHQF\&OLPDWHFKDQJHPD\DOVRD൵HFW'2'PLOLWDU\VXS-
SOLHVD൵HFWLQJZKHUH WKH\DUHSXUFKDVHGDQG WKHPHWKRGRI WUDQVSRUWDQGVWRUDJH
1  The author of this paper works in the Military Academy
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Strained access to staple resources, damaged infrastructure, and mass migration rep-
resent challenges to ensuring the stability of regions abroad, creating environments 
ripe for terrorist activity.
Most of the countries already recognize the threat of climate change on their 
military installations, and warn that more resources and monitoring systems are need-
ed to boost preparedness. 
(;$03/(
In 1992, Hurricane Andrew nearly wiped out Homestead Air Force Base in 
Florida and Hurricane Katrina caused USD 950 million of damage to Kessler Air 
Force Base in Mississippi. Both of these bases were rebuilt, but at the cost of millions 
of dollars. 
(;$03/(68QXVXDOUDLQVDQGÀRRGLQJFDXVHG86'PLOOLRQLQGDPDJHV
to 160 facilities at an Army installation in the USA Southwest. And record-breaking 
UDLQIDOO DQGÀDVKÀRRGLQJRYHUZKHOPHG WKH'HSDUWPHQWRI(QHUJ\¶V3DQWH[SODQW
which is responsible for assembling and disassembling nuclear weapons.
Operations:&OLPDWHFKDQJHD൵HFWVPLOLWDU\RSHUDWLRQVZKHWKHUWKH\DUHZDU
¿JKWLQJRSHUDWLRQVRUKXPDQLWDULDQPLVVLRQV)RUH[DPSOHFOLPDWHFKDQJHFDQSODFH
VLJQL¿FDQWEXUGHQVRQWKHVXSSO\FKDLQVDQGORJLVWLFDOFDSDFLW\RIDUPHGIRUFHVHQ-
JDJHGLQ³WKHDWUH´([WUHPHGURXJKWRUÀRRGLQJLQDUHDVZKHUHPLOLWDULHVDUHHQJDJHG
LQZDU¿JKWLQJIRUH[DPSOHFDQFRPSURPLVHZDWHUVXSSO\OLQHVDQGWKXVWKUHDWHQ
military personnel directly. Extreme drying can also increase the likelihood of non-
state actors using the seizure water of resources as leverage against populations and 
adversaries. An increase in the frequency and intensity of natural disasters may also 
put strains on the capacity of armed forces to deliver humanitarian assistance and 
disaster relief.
Strategy: Climate change can impact military strategy through increasing the 
SRVVLELOLW\RIGHVWDELOL]LQJFRQGLWLRQVLQVWUDWHJLFDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWUHJLRQVRIWKHZRUOG
In the Arctic, a melting ice cap, coupled with increasing tensions between Russia 
DQGRWKHU$UFWLFQDWLRQVFRXOGLQFUHDVHWKHOLNHOLKRRGRIFRQÀLFW,QWKH0LGGOH(DVW
DQG1RUWK$IULFD FOLPDWHFKDQJHH൵HFWVRQZDWHU VHFXULW\PD\ LQFUHDVH WKHSURE-
DELOLW\RILQVWDELOLW\LQWKHIXWXUH,Q&HQWUDO$VLDLQFUHDVHVLQJODFLDOPHOWDQGÀRRG-
ing, coupled with existing security dynamics (such as terrorism and nuclear materials 
SUROLIHUDWLRQFDQFUHDWHDYRODWLOHPL[,Q WKHEURDGHU$VLD3DFL¿FUHJLRQUDLQIDOO
variability will interact with a growing urban and coastal population, as well as an 
increasing demand for energy, to present enormous challenges to security in this in-
FUHDVLQJO\LPSRUWDQWSDUWRIWKHZRUOG0LJUDWLQJ¿VKVWRFNVLQWKH6RXWK&KLQD6HD
PD\FUHDWHSUHVVXUHVRQWKH¿VKLQJLQGXVWU\WRPRYHLQWRFRQWHVWHGZDWHUOHDGLQJWR
increased tensions between China, its neighbours and the United States. These risks 
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FDQLQFUHDVHWKHOLNHOLKRRGRIPLOLWDULHVEHLQJFDOOHGRQWRUHVROYHFRQÀLFWVRUSURYLGH
SRVWFRQÀLFWDVVLVWDQFH$OORIWKHVHG\QDPLFVZLOOSXWVWUHVVHVDQGVWUDLQVRQPLOLWDU\
strategies.
2. New Role for the Military
The Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the United Nations International Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) of November 2007 says that the surface warming cannot 
be stopped and in the best case the average temperature in 2090 to 2099 will be 1.1 
WRGHJUHHVKLJKHUWKDQEHWZHHQDQG$ERXW±RIDOOW\SHVRI
animals and plants could disappear if the worldwide average of temperature increases 
by more than 1.5 to 2.5 degrees Celsius.
7KHVHDOHYHOZLOOULVHXSE\±FHQWLPHWUHVZKLFKPHDQVDWKUHDWRIÀRRG-
ing for millions of people by 2080.
&OLPDWHFKDQJHLVVHULRXVO\DQGGLVSURSRUWLRQDWHO\D൵HFWLQJWKHOLYHVDQGOLYH-
lihoods of people in developing countries, increasing vulnerability to poverty and 
VRFLDO GHSULYDWLRQ ,WV LPSDFW LVPDJQL¿HG E\ WKH OLPLWHG KXPDQ LQVWLWXWLRQDO DQG
¿QDQFLDOUHVRXUFHV
More frequent and more severe droughts, heat waves, rising sea levels, more 
destructive tropical cyclones and changes in precipitation patterns are expected to 
have wide-ranging consequences for human health, food production and food secu-
rity, access to drinking water and human habitat, particularly in coastal areas. The 
world’s poorest areas of Sub–Saharan Africa, Asian river deltas, tropical areas of 
Latin America and some low-lying island nations face the greatest risk, both due to 
increased exposure to hazards and to underlying vulnerability and limited coping ca-
pacities.
In 2006, drought posed a threat to more than ten million people in Kenya and 
Ethiopia alone. In 2007, the destruction of farmland displaced over 20 million people 
in Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan. Tens of thousands of people in nine West 
African countries in the Sahel region lost their homes or livelihoods during unprec-
HGHQWHGÀRRGLQJLQ6HSWHPEHU7KHUHLVDJURZLQJFRQVHQVXVDPRQJWKHVFLHQ-
WL¿FFRPPXQLW\WKDWWKHLQFUHDVHLQWKHVHYHULW\DQGIUHTXHQF\RIWKHVHH[WUHPHHYHQWV
is a direct result of global warming and changing climate.
Rising global temperatures will increase resource scarcity, particularly regard-
ing water and arable land for food production. This is likely to lead to greater migra-
tory movements, which in turn could combine with existing factors of tension to in-
FUHDVLQJO\FDXVLQJFRQÀLFWVERWKZLWKLQDQGEHWZHHQFRXQWULHV'HPDQGIRUHVVHQWLDO
resources has already exacerbated underlying social, political and economic tensions, 
FRQWULEXWLQJWRYLROHQWFRQÀLFWVLQSODFHVVXFKDV'DUIXU&KDG6RPDOLDRUWKH&HQWUDO
African Republic.
Environmental migration is the source of a new category of refugees or inter-
nally displaced persons (IDPs) leaving lands at risk, either voluntarily or because of 
JRYHUQPHQWFRHUFLRQ5LVLQJVHDOHYHOVWKDWGDPDJHFRDVWDOUHJLRQVWKURXJKÀRRGLQJ
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DQGHURVLRQGHVHUWL¿FDWLRQDQGVKULQNLQJIUHVKZDWHUFRXOGFUHDWHPLOOLRQVRIHQYL-
ronmental refugees according to some forecasts. The Institute for Environment and 
Human Security at the United Nations University forecasts up to 50 million environ-
mental refugees by the end of the decade.
$VZHKDYHDOUHDG\VHHQWKHH൵HFWVRIFOLPDWHFKDQJHDUHZHOONQRZQDQGZH
VRRQZLOO¿QGRXWWKDWDQLQFUHDVHRISUREOHPVUHJDUGLQJVHFXULW\DQGGLVDVWHUVHVSH-
FLDOO\FRQÀLFWVRIPLJUDWLRQDQG³UHVRXUFHZDUV´ZLOOWDNHSODFH)RULQVWDQFH$IULFD
GXHWRD&WHPSHUDWXUHLQFUHDVHDVWKH;;,FHQWXU\XQIROGVZLOOH[SHULHQFHLQ-
FUHDVHGGHVHUWL¿FDWLRQZDWHUVWUHVVDQGGLVHDVH,QWKHXQVWDEOH0LGGOH(DVWLQIXWXUH
there will be water stress, soil erosion and accelerated loss of arable land. The Indian 
government intends to build an eight feet high barbed wire fence for the length of its 
2,500-mile frontier with Bangladesh. Delhi‘s intention is to prevent migration from 
%DQJODGHVKDVULVLQJVHDOHYHOVEURXJKWDERXWE\ÄFDWDVWURSKLFFOLPDWHFKDQJH³DUH
forecast to inundate the low-lying country. 
Thus, on the one hand we have massive potential dislocation that rising sea 
levels could bring to delta regions in Bangladesh, China, Egypt and Nigeria, on the 
other hand a drying out of continental interiors will lead to migration and tension too.
Therefore, if the consequences of climate change increase as shown before, we 
will have new and more acute humanitarian crises that can lead to regional instability, 
HVSHFLDOO\PRUHFRQÀLFWVQRWRQO\EHWZHHQQDWLRQVDQGVWDWHVEXWDOVRLQVLGHVWDWHV
DQGUHJLRQVEHWZHHQWKHGL൵HUHQWWULEHVDV\RXFDQVHHDOUHDG\LQRQHRIWKHZRUVWDI-
fected areas - the Sahel, where tensions among competing nomads, subsistence farm-
ers and other communities are increasing.
The military will probably have to deploy more peacekeeping forces or del-
egate authority to regional organizations such as the African Union (AU) e.g. in the 
'DUIXUFRQÀLFW7KLVPHDQVWKDW3HDFH6XSSRUW2SHUDWLRQVDUHQHHGHGIRUVWDELOL]DWLRQ
in the world and in special regions – but we will not only have Peace Keeping and 
Peace Enforcement but as a challenge to the consequences of climate change, we also 
ZLOOKDYHWRIXO¿OPRUHDQGPRUH+XPDQLWDULDQ2SHUDWLRQV7KHPLOLWDU\ZLOOKDYH
to focus more on the Petersberg Tasks3 and on an increase of involvement in huger 
disaster relief operations.
While military forces have roles in disaster relief, the broader impact of seri-
ous climate change will require multinational, multi-agency cooperation on a scale 
heretofore unimaginable and could provide no-fault ground for global cooperation.
But it also means that there is a new role for military: New types of forces 
– dealing more with Civil Military Coordination (CIMIC), specialized training espe-
3  The Petersberg tasks cover a great range of possible military missions, ranging from the most 
simple to the most robust military intervention. They are formulated as:
- Humanitarian and rescue tasks
- Peacekeeping tasks
- Tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.
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cially for disaster management operations, liaison and cooperation in international 
humanitarian operations like during the Tsunami in 2005 in SE-Asia, where more than 
WURRSVZHUHRSHUDWLQJIRUWKHD൵HFWHGSHRSOHLQWKHUHJLRQ7KLVZDVWKH¿UVW
powerful sign of the Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) project, showing that 
only military can provide special equipment and troops for the people on short term. 
But we should still keep in mind: Military is always the last resort and should not take 
over the civilian tasks. 
The new challenge for the military is clear: more humanitarian operations need 
more specialized training at all levels and for all ranks. To reach this high degree of 
LQWHURSHUDELOLW\LWLVQHFHVVDU\WRNQRZDERXWWKHGL൵HUHQWV\VWHPVDQGWKHLUWUDLQLQJ
opportunities.
3. Primary Geography and Climate Concerns 
Impacting on NATO by 2035
Based on the analysis, the primary geography and climate concerns impacting 
on NATO by 2035, as related to urbanization, are likely to include the following is-
sues:
Urban overstretch, decay and fragility. Massive growth of urban popula-
tions, principally in lesser-developed countries and regions that lack the governmen-
WDO¿QDQFLDODQGLQIUDVWUXFWXUHFDSDFLW\WRGHDOZLWKWKHSDFHDQGVFDOHRIWKDWJURZWK
will prompt overstretch the inability of city and national governments to cope with ur-
banization in some cities. In some cases this may result in out-of-control slum growth, 
in others (perhaps established cities that are economically or demographically declin-
ing) it may manifest as urban decay and feral urban spaces. Resilience the adaptive 
capacity to deal with urban fragility will be an increasingly important concern for 
NATO analysts and planners by the 2030s.
Internal secession and the rise of urban non-state armed actors. Citizens 
at the top of the socio-economic and political ladder will increasingly opt out of city 
governance and infrastructure, establishing privatized, “gated community” enclaves, 
avoiding interaction with the mass population, and thus attempting “urban internal 
secession”. At the bottom of the ladder, marginalized and excluded populations of-
ten in slums on the urban fringe-will be excluded from or unable to access govern-
ment systems, and community-based, private groups will emerge to meet the popula-
WLRQ¶VQHHGV3RRUDQGD൷XHQWFRPPXQLWLHVDOLNHZLOOHPSOR\DUPHGJURXSVSULYDWH
military corporations, private security, community-based police forces, and militias, 
gangs) to protect these enclaves. In some cases criminals will gain control of areas 
against the population’s will, and may establish alliances with business and political 
OHDGHUVLQFOXGLQJJRYHUQPHQWR൶FLDOVDQGORFDOPLOLWDU\RUSROLFHFRPPDQGHUV$VD
consequence, for NATO in 2035, non-state armed groups and hybrid operators in ur-
ban enclaves will emerge as potentially powerful adversaries (or allies) in operations 
to secure, stabilize or provide humanitarian assistance in such cities.
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Littoral urban vulnerability. There is a tendency for urban populations to 
cluster in littoral areas including coastlines, low-elevation coastal zones, and broader 
littoral (coastal, swamp, riverine or estuarine) environments. Even leaving aside any 
climate change, this tendency will place increasing numbers of people, as well as a 
vastly increased value of commercial property and national economic assets, at risk 
from coastal weather events. Floods, storm surges, tsunamis and localized inunda-
tions are already the most common and widespread natural disasters, and as more and 
more people crowd into dense urban settlements in littoral zones by the 2030s, the 
YXOQHUDELOLW\RIFLWLHVWRVXFKHYHQWVDVZHOODVH൵RUWVWRPLWLJDWHWKHPZLOOEHFRPHDQ
increasingly important concern for NATO.
&OLPDWHLQGXFHG PLJUDWLRQ DQG FRQÀLFW Assuming a degree of climate 
change commensurate with the conservative estimates discussed earlier, by the 2030s 
there is likely to be increasing concern among NATO governments about climate-
induced migration, whether internal (as rural populations move to cities to avoid ru-
UDOHQYLURQPHQWDOSUREOHPVVXFKDVGURXJKWDQGGHVHUWL¿FDWLRQRU LQWHUQDWLRQDO DV
SRSXODWLRQVPRYHLQWRRUDPRQJ1$72FRXQWULHV3RWHQWLDOIRUXQUHVWDQGFRQÀLFW
including both irregular and state-on-state warfare arising from climate-induced mi-
gration is hard to quantify, but by 2035 more will be known about this phenomenon, 
which is likely to remain a key concern for the alliance.
Vulnerability of cities to climate change. On more aggressive climate pro-
MHFWLRQVFKDQJHV LQDYHUDJH WHPSHUDWXUHPRGL¿HG UDLQIDOODQGDQ LQFUHDVHGQXP-
ber and severity of extreme weather events and natural disasters will be detectable 
by the 2030s, prompting sustained concern from governments worldwide including 
NATO countries. Rising risk from pandemic and epidemic disease, and critical re-
source shortages including water, food and energy are likely to mean that climate 
change vulnerabilities in large and medium-sized cities remain key concerns for the 
Alliance in 2035. Some richer countries (including several in NATO) are already en-
JDJHGLQVLJQL¿FDQWPLWLJDWLRQDQGDGDSWDWLRQH൵RUWVDQGPD\VX൵HUFRPSDUDWLYHO\
little disruption from climate change. Other countries may come late to the problem, 
SURPSWLQJWKHPLQGXOJHLQSDQLFNHGRULOOFRQVLGHUHGFDWFKXSH൵RUWVIURPWKHV
onward) that may damage or disrupt key cities, while the majority of rapidly urban-
L]LQJFRXQWULHVLQWKH*OREDO6RXWKVLPSO\ODFNWKHUHVRXUFHVWRH൵HFWLYHO\DGDSW
4. Impact of Geography and Climate on NATO by 2035
Impact of geography and climate FDQLGHQWLI\WKHIROORZLQJVSHFL¿FFDSDELOLW\
implications for NATO:
Cluttered battlespace. The presence of vastly larger numbers of people, vehi-
FOHVDLUFUDIWLQFOXGLQJ8$9VDQGR൵VKRUHYHVVHOVDQGLQVWDOODWLRQVLQXUEDQVSDFHV
by 2035 will contribute to a densely cluttered battlespace, both in the physical/spatial 
sense and in terms of the electromagnetic spectrum. This will complicate targeting 
and hamper mobility for a NATO force attempting to identify and prosecute targets, 
move through cluttered sea and airspace, and operate in or around dense urban envi-
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ronments. Capabilities to understand, analyze, and plan for operations in these envi-
ronments will be critical.
Disaggregated battlespace. Urbanized environments create disaggregated bat-
tlespaces that break up a larger force into small units, while fragmenting combat ac-
WLRQLQWRQXPHURXVVPDOOÀHHWLQJFORVHUDQJHHQJDJHPHQWV,PSURYHPHQWVLQZHDS-
ons and communications technology by 2035 (analyzed elsewhere) will enable adver-
saries to exploit this disaggregated battlespace to soak up large numbers of troops and 
GLVVLSDWHWKHH൵HFWVRI1$72FRPEDWSRZHU
Edgeless cities. As discussed above, the emergence of city clusters (in which the 
HGJHVRIH[LVWLQJFLWLHVPHUJHDQGWKHVSDFHEHWZHHQWKHP¿OOVZLWKVOXPVOLJKWLQGXVWU\
RUSRVWLQGXVWULDOZDVWHODQGDQGXUEDQLQ¿OOLQZKLFKRSHQVSDFHVZLWKLQH[LVWLQJFLW-
LHVDUH¿OOHGLQE\QHZVHWWOHPHQWE\ZLOOPHDQWKDWVRPHXUEDQL]HGVSDFHVZLOO
lack open areas or edges that enable maneuver by a NATO force using current opera-
tional doctrine. For example, clear beach landing sites, beach exits, areas for airmobile 
DQGDLUODQGHGIRUFHVPD\EHH[WUHPHO\GL൶FXOWWRLGHQWLI\LQHGJHOHVVFLWLHV
Sea/Air Points of entry. Because of the changing nature of the environment, 
and the encroachment of urban environments into previously open space, the seizure 
of air and sea points of entry for NATO forces operating in urban space will become 
extremely important, posing operational and tactical risk for mission achievement 
if such points of entry cannot be seized, held, defended and operated for extended 
SHULRGVRIWLPH3RUWVDLU¿HOGVWHUPLQDOIDFLOLWLHVDQGGRFN\DUGVZLOOEHFRPHLQFUHDV-
ingly important strategic objectives, due to the fact that they will be some of the few 
remaining areas of open and accessible space across large urban areas, and because of 
their critical importance to the functioning of cities.
Urban mapping. A related capability implication will be the need for NATO 
to enable rapid, crowd-sourced, self-synchronized mapping capabilities for urban 
VSDFHVWRLQFOXGHÀXLGUDSLGO\FKDQJLQJPRGXODUDQGLQIRUPDOVHWWOHPHQWV7KHVH
capabilities would focus less on mapping the locations of particular buildings and 
infrastructure (which is already relatively straightforward) and more on identifying 
the purpose, ownership, and social-political-economic orientation of key locations in 
urban areas where the force might seek to operate.
Urban protected mobility. Capabilities will be needed to allow NATO forces 
WRPDQHXYHULQDFOXWWHUHGFRQVWULFWHGXUEDQHQYLURQPHQWZKLOHDFKLHYLQJVX൶FLHQW
¿UHSRZHUSURWHFWLRQDQGPRELOLW\ WRHQDEOHDGHTXDWHIRUFHSURWHFWLRQ7KHQDUURZ
streets/alleys and constricted mobility corridors of informal urban settlements will 
require smaller, narrower, lighter platforms, which will need 360-degree protection 
against blast, fragmentation and penetration. These platforms may employ active sen-
sors and active defense systems, but such systems must take into account the collateral 
risk to dismounted forces and civil population in the environment. This applies both to 
ground and air mobility platforms, and (in the case of littoral urbanized environments) 
may apply also to maritime and riverine platforms.
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Subterranean/Subsurface Warfare. NATO forces in 2035 will require the ca-
pability to undertake subterranean warfare in sewers, tunnel systems and under build-
ings, as well as underwater beneath the surface of canals, waterways and harbours. 
7KHVH FDSDELOLWLHVZLOO LQFOXGH VLJQL¿FDQWO\ HQKDQFHG GRFWULQH HGXFDWLRQ WUDLQLQJ
and simulation, as well as breathing apparatus, sensors, motion and heat detectors, 
ZHDSRQV\VWHPVFDSDEOHRIEHLQJRSHUDWHGVDIHO\LQFRQ¿QHGVSDFHVDQGV\VWHPVIRU
logistic support, casualty evacuation and unmanned surveillance and reconnaissance. 
Indeed, given the importance of the subsurface domain in urban operations, this may 
QHHGWREHDVHSDUDWHLQWHJUDWHGGHYHORSPHQWH൵RUWLQLWVRZQULJKW
Water Scarcity. As noted earlier, climate projections for the 2030s suggest 
drought. Like sea-level rise, water stress is extremely likely to occur, even indepen-
dently of climate change, simply due to rapid population growth and urbanization, 
so that water shortage is a virtual certainty for major cities in 2035, even in the most 
benign future climate scenario. For example, an integrated assessment published by 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 2014 suggests that “for many develop-
ing nations water-demand increases due to population growth and economic activity 
KDYHDPXFKVWURQJHUH൵HFWRQZDWHUVWUHVVWKDQFOLPDWHFKDQJH%\HFRQRPLF
growth and population change alone can lead to an additional 1.8 billion people living 
in regions with at least moderate water stress. Of this additional 1.8 billion people, 
DUHIRXQGLQGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHV8QFHUWDLQUHJLRQDOFOLPDWHFKDQJHFDQSOD\
a secondary role to either exacerbate or dampen the increase in water stress due to 
socio-economic growth. The strongest climate impacts on relative changes in water 
stress are seen over many areas in Africa, but strong impacts also occur over Europe, 
6RXWKHDVW$VLDDQG1RUWK$PHULFD7KHFRPELQHGH൵HFWVRIVRFLRHFRQRPLFJURZWK
and uncertain climate change lead to a 1.0 to 1.3 billion increase of the world’s 2050 
projected population living in regions with overly exploited water conditions where 
total potential water requirements will consistently exceed surface-water supply.”
Even Europe, where drought is likely to be milder, water stress is expected by 
2030 for Mediterranean littoral countries, and urbanized and industrialized areas in 
northwest Europe 
Food shortages. Climate and geographical factors associated with urbaniza-
WLRQVXJJHVWVLJQL¿FDQWOLNHOLKRRGRIIRRGVFDUFLW\LQWKHWLPHIUDPH7KLVGHULYHV
from several interrelated factors:
- Nutritional transition in urbanizing countries. Countries that are rapidly urban-
izing tend to go through what is known as a “nutritional transition”.The World Health 
Organization projects that, by 2030, per capita calorie consumption will have risen by 
URXJKO\SHUFHQWIURPFXUUHQWFRQVXPSWLRQDVRIZKLOHVSHFL¿FUHJLRQVZLOO
see much greater rise in demand for food per capita as a result of urbanization, with 
demand rising by 7.1 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa and 6.9 percent in South Asia be-
tween now and 2030, for example. Note that these are per capita requirements when 
WKHPXOWLSO\LQJH൵HFWRIYHU\VLJQL¿FDQWSRSXODWLRQJURZWKLQWKHVHDUHDVGLVFXVVHG
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earlier) is factored in, these data suggest major food production challenges for these 
regions in the next 15 years.
- Food scarcity and violence. Several studies have shown that food density 
maps can be used to predict the emergence of security hotspots in urban environ-
ments, suggesting a strong correlation (and perhaps causative link) between food scar-
city and violence within cities. In addition, a comprehensive study by the World Food 
Programme in 2011 concluded that “food insecurity especially when caused by a rise 
LQIRRGSULFHLVDWKUHDWDQGLPSDFWPXOWLSOLHUIRUYLROHQWFRQÀLFW,WPLJKWQRWEHD
direct cause and rarely the only cause, but combined with other factors, for example 
in the political or economic spheres, it could be the factor that determines whether and 
ZKHQYLROHQWFRQÀLFWVZLOOHUXSW&KDQJHVLQIRRGVHFXULW\UDWKHUWKDQOHYHOVRIIRRG
LQVHFXULW\DUHSUREDEO\PRVWLQÀXHQWLDO´7KLVLQWXUQVXJJHVWVWKDWDGDSWLYHFDSDFLW\
the ability for cities to regulate and ensure a reliable supply of food to key populations 
is a key component of urban fragility in this respect.
Energy Scarcity. $¿QDOIDFWRUUHODWHGWRSURGXFWLRQDQGGLVWULEXWLRQRIERWK
IRRGDQGZDWHU VLQFHERWK WKHVH UHTXLUH VLJQL¿FDQW HQHUJ\XVH LV HQHUJ\ VFDUFLW\
LQWKHIXWXUHXUEDQHQYLURQPHQW$VWKH&KLHI6FLHQWL¿F$GYLVHUWRWKH%ULWLVK*RY-
ernment, Professor Sir John Beddington, argued in 2009, the world faces a “perfect 
storm” in the 2030s as global demand for food, energy and water peak, and as urban-
ization and industrialization increase demand for these commodities even as popula-
WLRQDOVRJURZVYHU\VLJQL¿FDQWO\%HGGLQJWRQ(OHFWULFLW\GHPDQGLVIRUHFDVW
to grow by 30 percent by 2035 as a result of this combination of factors, while demand 
IRURLOFRDODQGJDVZLOOLQFUHDVHVLJQL¿FDQWO\LQWKHVDPHWLPHIUDPH7KHVDPHGLV-
tribution, production and supply line vulnerabilities, noted above for food supply, will 
D൵HFWXUEDQSRSXODWLRQVUHOLDQWRQHQHUJ\VXSSO\DQGZLOOIRUPSDUWRIDQLQFUHDVHG
pattern of urban fragility by 2035, while some projections suggest that global demand 
for energy will double by 2050 [Mike Hightower and Suzanne A. Pierce (2008) “The 
energy challenge” in 1DWXUHVol. 452, pp. 285-286 (20 March 2008)
5. Resilience
Many adaptations to climate change that involve the military can result in sig-
QL¿FDQW FREHQH¿WV VXFK DV DOOHYLDWLQJSRYHUW\ DQG HQKDQFLQJGHYHORSPHQW HVSH-
cially in developing countries. Various adaptation interventions promote well-being 
DQGVHFXULW\WKURXJKWKHGLYHUVL¿FDWLRQRILQFRPHJHQHUDWLQJDFWLYLWLHVDGDSWLYHPL-
JUDWLRQLQDJULFXOWXUDODQG¿VKLQJFRPPXQLWLHVLQVXUDQFHV\VWHPVDQGHGXFDWLRQRI
women.
Flood preparedness. 7KHEHQH¿WVRISURWHFWLQJDJDLQVWLQFUHDVHGFRDVWDOÀRRG-
ing and land loss due to submergence and erosion at the global scale are greater than 
the social and economic costs of inaction. Without adaptation, hundreds of millions of 
SHRSOHZLOOEHD൵HFWHGE\FRDVWDOÀRRGLQJDQGZLOOEHGLVSODFHGGXHWRODQGORVVE\
2100. The majority are in East, Southeast and South Asia. However, some low-lying 
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developing countries (e.g. Bangladesh, Vietnam) and small island states are expected 
WRIDFHXQDYRLGDEOHODQGORVVDQGDQQXDOÀRRGLQJGDPDJH
Relocating military installations and bases. Numerous naval bases located 
in coastal areas may need to be relocated further inland if the coast is not protected. 
Some may require relocation even with coastal protection.
Preparing for population displacement. 6RPHPLJUDWLRQ ÀRZV DUH FDXVHG
by changes in resource availability and ecosystem services. Major extreme weather 
HYHQWVKDYHLQWKHSDVWOHGWRVLJQL¿FDQWSRSXODWLRQGLVSODFHPHQWDQGWKHOLNHO\LQ-
crease in extreme events will amplify the challenges and risks of such displacement. 
&OLPDWHFKDQJHH൵HFWVRIWKLVW\SHSUHVHQWFKURQLFDQGHSLVRGLFFKDOOHQJHVWRVWDWH
capacity and to the fundamental welfare of populations at a scale that raises questions 
of state stability. The military has the ability to provide infrastructure immediately, 
bringing medical supplies, lift capability, and communications to devastated regions.
Adapting weapons. Climate change “will also impact the design of current and 
future weapons systems to account for extreme weather. It is anticipating more health 
risks from exposing troops to greater heat, having to deal with dustier training grounds 
DQG¿HOGHQYLURQPHQWVDQGQHHGLQJWRFRSHZLWKSKHQRPHQDOLNHHURVLRQDQGÀRRG-
ing lapping at its facilities. 
Preparing for water insecurity. Climate change is projected to reduce both the 
quantity and quality of freshwater resources in many regions of the world. Ground-
water resources will be reduced in many regions. Adaptation measures can include 
water resource management projects, additional water treatment systems, and water 
FRQVHUYDWLRQ0DQ\RIWKHVHPHWKRGVDUHH[SHQVLYHDQGWDNHVLJQL¿FDQWDPRXQWVRI
time to implement. This may limit their application in poorer countries.
Increasing resilience. Strategies and actions with an emphasis on disaster risk 
reduction can be pursued that increase climate resilience while at the same time help-
ing to improve human livelihoods, social and economic well-being and responsible 
environmental management.
6. Mitigation potential
The global military complex is an energy-intensive industry and in many na-
tions, defense forces are the largest single consumer of fossil fuels. Given the sig-
QL¿FDQFH RI LWV LPSDFW RQ FOLPDWH FRQGLWLRQV WKH GHIHQFH VHFWRUPD\ FRPH XQGHU
VLJQL¿FDQWSUHVVXUHWRUHGXFHLWV*+*HPLVVLRQV±HVSHFLDOO\LIJRYHUQPHQWVHQDFW
policies to curb climate change in line with the globally agreed 2°C target. However, 
UHGXFLQJIXHOFRQVXPSWLRQPD\EHQH¿WRSHUDWLRQVSDUWLFXODUO\IRUGHSOR\HGIRUFHV
where moving large quantities of fuel is costly and dangerous.
0RUHH൶FLHQWYHKLFOHV Internal combustion engines and jet turbines are be-
FRPLQJLQFUHDVLQJO\H൶FLHQW([SHFWDWLRQVDUHIRU±LPSURYHPHQWVLQWKHIXHO
H൶FLHQF\RIOLJKWGXW\YHKLFOHVE\FRPSDUHGWRSUHVHQW1HZDLUFUDIWW\SLFDOO\
R൵HUD±LPSURYHPHQWLQIXHOH൶FLHQF\RYHUH[LVWLQJPRGHOVGULYHQE\LP-
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SURYHGHQJLQHSHUIRUPDQFHZHLJKWUHGXFWLRQVDQGGHVLJQ)XUWKHUJDLQVRI±
between 2030 and 2050 are possible, compared with 2005 levels.
Alternative fuels. It may be possible to replace kerosene with biofuels, which 
R൵HUV GLUHFW*+*HPLVVLRQ UHGXFWLRQV RI 6KLIWLQJ WR HOHFWULF RU K\GURJHQ
fuelled vehicles promises to dramatically reduce emissions.
Operational improvements. Aviation carbon dioxide (CO
2
) emissions can be 
UHGXFHGWKURXJKPRUHH൶FLHQWSODQQLQJRIRSHUDWLRQVLQFOXGLQJURXWHVDOWLWXGHVDQG
VSHHGV8QLQWHQGHGFRQVHTXHQFHVRIVRPHH൵RUWVWRPLWLJDWHHPLVVLRQVDQGDGDSWWR
FOLPDWHFKDQJHFDQLQFUHDVHLQVHFXULW\DQGWKHULVNRIDUPHGFRQÀLFW:KHUHWKHVHHI-
forts change the distribution of or access to resources, they have the potential to cause 
RUDJJUDYDWHFRQÀLFW)RUH[DPSOHELRIXHOSURGXFWLRQFDQOHDGWRGLVSXWHVRYHUODQG
IRRGSULFHVSLNHVDQGULRWLQJ2൵HULQJSD\PHQWVIRU5HGXFHG(PLVVLRQVIURP'HIRU-
HVWDWLRQDQG)RUHVW'HJUDGDWLRQ5(''SURMHFWVPD\WULJJHUFRQÀLFWRYHUODQGDQG
property rights. And some forms of low-carbon power, such as hydropower, have led 
WRFRQÀLFWRYHUIRUFHGUHVHWWOHPHQW
Summary
&OLPDWHFKDQJHLVDIDFWDQGWKHH൵HFWVDUHZHOONQRZQ
Nobody can say that it does not exist. A lot of small pieces put together in a 
puzzle show us now how dramatic it already is. And it does not only have an im-
pact on civilians, it also has an impact on the military. However, this means that we 
maybe have to change our planning and training according to consequences of climate 
change. Militaries are concerned about climate change because it is their job to ad-
dress all credible threats to their respective nation’s security. These threats come in 
forms both direct and indirect, including direct threats to military installations from 
sea level rise and extreme droughts, and indirect threats through the exacerbation of 
instability in critical regions.
Problems in connection with security and disasters will increase – especially 
“resource wars”. There will be a new role for the military - if climate change in-
creases, more Peace Support Operations will be necessary (Peacekeeping, Peace En-
forcement), but also more Humanitarian Operations, especially disaster management 
operations, and more tasks focused on the Petersberg Tasks.
New types of forces are needed – dealing with CIMIC, specialized training 
especially for disaster management operations, liaison, etc.
$QGODVWEXWQRWOHDVW±7KHUHLVDOVRDQHHGIRUDQHZGH¿QLWLRQRIVHFXULW\
especially in our military strategic concepts, and maybe additional military tasks – the 
impact of climate change must be included in planning.
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